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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJtah 
RU8H; KLA.B"l'A, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
j.LBEHT N". N~I ITH, dba OX RANCH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
~TA'l'E~IENT OF' KIND OF CASE 
This is an aetion for personal injuries arising out 
of a <'olli::.;ion between the automobile in which Respond-
ent was riding and a dead cow owned by Appellant. Said 
cow had been killed by another car driven by one Cox 
:md left l»ing on the highway. 
DT~POSl'l'ION IN LOWER COURT 
The <.'a:oie was tried to a jury on special interrogator-
iP,,. Tlw answers of the jury were inconsistent. Re-
spundent filed a motion for judgment n.o.v., for additur, 
and in the alternative for a new trial on damages only. 
f)n De('emlwr 3, 19fi4, the Court entered the following 
ruling: 
"In this matter the evidence shows without 
dispntP that the animal involved in the collision 
hPre in qtIPstion had escaped from the vehicle 
of the defendants. The Court is of the opinirin 
that Seetion 27 -1-33, U CA, 1953, was violated Iii 
the escape of the animal in question. Under tli~ 
provisions of Section 27-1-34, UCA, 1953, !ht 
plaintiff is entitled to recover her damages. Tht 
motion of the plaintiff for judgment notwith 
stand the verdict is granted. 
"A new trial is granted on the issue of the 
plaintiff's damages. 
"Dated and sigrn•d this 3rd day of Deeen1 
her, 1964. 
R. L. TUCKETT 
R. L. TUCKETT, Judge" 
RELIEF 80UGH'l' ON INTERMEDIATE APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of that part of saia 
ruling to the effect that Section 27-1-33 and Section 
27-1-34, U CA, 1953, were violated by the escape of the 
animal in question and that plaintiff is entitled to re· 
cover her damages, and that the motion of the plaintili 
notwithstanding the verdict is granted and a new tria! 
is granted on the issue of damages only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case has been tried twice. The first trial wa; 
before the Honorable Aldon Anderson and a jury. The 
jury returned a verdict for defendant. Judge .Ander· 
son felt that his instructions relating to proximate cause 
were incorrect and so on a motion by plaintiff for a new 
' ·1 
trial as to damages only the Court granted a new tna 
on all issues. The next trial was before the Honorahlf 
R. L. 'l'uckett and a jury. .Judge Tuckett submitteil 
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tltr <·as(' to tl1,· .inr~· on special interrogatories. The 
ans11rrs returned ll~· the jury were inconsistent. Re-
spornkr1t tltf•n filed a motion for judgment n. o. v. or for 
adclitnr, or in the alternative for a new trial 011 damages 
only. Un Deeember ;j, 1963, the Court entered an order 
.~ranting Hep011dn:t's petition for judgment n.o.v and 
'.!rantrd Hespondent a new trial on damages only. 
TJ1en·upon ,\ppellant petitioned this Court for an inter-
mPdiatP ap1wal, which was granted on December 15, 
1964. 
This 1s an action brought by Respondent against 
,\ppellant for ]Jersonal injuries which she is alleged to 
have :·mffered in an accident which took place in Tooele 
County on llecernlier 29, 1961, on Highway 40 about 45 
mi!Ps Ea:-t of ·wendover, Utah. Appellant operates a 
livestoek rmwh in Hub:; Valley, Nevada. At the time 
of th:' accident he was the owner of a truck upon which 
ll'as rnnstrn<'.ted a cattle rack which he used for trans-
porting livestock from his ranch to the Ogden Stock-
Yards at Ogden, rtah, for sale. On December 29, 1961, 
he 1MH1Pd in said rack seven grown cows and two grown 
bulls and started for Ogden. When he reached a point 
apprn:xima tel~· five miles West of Grantsville, Utah, 
he wa:s flagged down hy the driver of a following car 
and told that his tailgate on said rack was loose, where-
upon he stopped and found that the tailgate had loosened 
and three cows and one bull were missing. He immedi-
ately replaced the tailgate in its proper sockets, re-
plaeed two bolts which were then missing, turned around 
on the highway and traveled back about 40 miles in 
«eareh of the missing animals, when he came to the 
srene of th0 accident. Neil Bishop, a trooper for the 
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Utah High\vay Patrol, investigated the accident. He 
arrived at the scene at about 7 :15 p.rn. He received t] 11• 
call at about 6 :45 p.m. when he was about 50 miles Ea,t 
from the scene of the accident. He described the rnad 
as having two lanes of traffic, divided by a hroken wliitP 
center line, on level terrain, no hills or obstructions, and 
straight. The road was of asphalt composition. I! 
was dry, just in average condition ('l'r. 13), with no par-
ticular defects. It had been chipped, whirh helps to 
reflect some light. It is not like a road of new-laid 
mix, which tends to absorb most all of the headlight~ 
(Tr. 14). He observed a 1961 Cadillac (the car in which 
Respondent was riding) on its right hand side of thf' 
roadway at a point indicated on a diagram placed by 
him on the blackboard. He also observed a 1956 Pontial' 
(Cox' car) on the left hand shoulder and some distance 
back of a puddle of radiator fluid, whieh indicated tlw 
probable final position of the Pontiac. He also noticed 
heavy, swerving marks at a point indicated on !lie ' 
drawing, some gouge marks, and 9' 8" of skid 
marks (evidently made by the Klafta car). He also 
noticed a dead black cow. It had been removed from 
its final position prior to his arrival. The animal wai 1 
black (Tr. 15). The point "pp-1" was identified as tlw 
probable point of impact of the Cox car where it could 
possibly have hit the cow, and "pp-2" as the possible 
point of impact of the Klafta car where it could have 
had the collision with the cow. The skid marks from r 
PP-2 showed a swerving, heavy black smear leading to 
Cadillac. They were caused, he believed, by the left 
front wheel being locked (Tr. 15). In the collision the 
distribution of the fender and parts had ('ompletely 
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lotked that "·Jipe] (Tr. 16) and kept it lorked on that 
~idP. 'J'hese 111arks (•xtended a distance of 120' covered 
liY the Klafta C'ar as it traveled West from the point 
of irnpad, s\\'erving and c:orning to rest ('l'r. 17). The 
front encl of the Klafta car was quite heavily damaged, 
indicating that the <larnage had been inflicted by a col-
li~ion at a fairl.'· low center of gravity to the vehicle. The 
('ox vehiele showed heavy damage to the hood, head-
lights and top (Tr. 17), which was a basis for his stat-
ing that the vehicle went underneath and the cow was 
propelled up over the top of the vehicle and stopped 
on the roadway behind it (Tr. 18). On cross-examin-
ation he stated that maintenance and chipping of the 
road is done regularly as the road needs it, and this is 
a factor in lighting the road\Vay, making it more of a 
lighter textured surface than travel wear will do to it. 
Tlie weather was dear. It was a dark night. The road 
'urface was dry, no fog, no mist or dust in the air (Tr. 
32). It was ascertained that the Cox car was the first 
to hit tlw animal (Tr. 34). The Cox car was facing 
West, partially on the roadway, so that the rear end 
of the Cox car would be faring an oncoming car from 
the East. 'l'he Cox car had red reflectors on the rear 
arnl tl1e ligl1ts from an oncoming car would reflect them-
,<dre' into the rear. As the lights hit the surface they 
would definitPl.\· reflect back ('l'r. 36). They would be 
visible for prnhahly, under most conditions, 250 to 300 
fept as a minimum. The Cox car was partially on the 
:i,phalt pmtion of the' highway (Tr. 37). He estimated 
that thP top of the animal would be about 36" above the 
'urfare of thP highway. The appearanre of the marks 
on the higlmay \rnnld indi«ate that the Klafta car was 
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braked and it::-; wheels loeked for a distance of 9' 8" 
before striking the carcass ('l'r. 38). 'l'he Klafta car 
started to brake 9' 8" East of the point of impact and 
then ('Ontinued over the cow and down the highway for 
a distance of 125 feet before it came to rest (Tr. 39). 
J._ copy prepared by the witness of the drawing on the 
blackboard was offered in evidence marked "P-1" and 
received in evidence (Tr. 41). Rose Klafta testified 
1 
concerning the happening of the accident that she wa> : 
an occupant in the Klafta car that becam(· involved m 1 
the accident (Tr. 42). She was seated in the front 
:,;eat next to the driver and her lrn:,;band, Bruno seated 
in the rear seat. That her son, Richard, was the driver: 
that they had come from Kankakee, Illinois, and were 
enroute to Sacramento, California; that there were no 
1 
cars in front of them (Tr. 44). (Note: The Cox tar 
must have been a considerable distance ahead of tlw111 
when he struck and killed the cow.) She saw this blark 
object in front of them. Richard applied hi~ l1rake' 
real hard and we hit some hard object (Tr. 45). Jn<t 
before the accident she said to Richard, "Thank Gorl 
for bringing us this far in safety." (Tr. 62). There 
were no seat belts in the car. She was thrown forward 
and the seat came back with her. She admitted that if she 
had had a seat belt on she was sure it wouldn't havr 
(Tr. 63). 
Richard Klafta (Tr. 70) testified that they left 
Kankakee on the 27th day of December around 4:00 
p.m. (Tr. 72). He did all the driving. They arrived in 
Salt Lake Citv late in the afternoon but did not stop, 
and continued- on Highway 40. The accident happened 
about 6 :30 or 6 :35. In describing how the accident 
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lwppened he said, "I was driving down R0ntP 40 and 
all of a sudden lien~ wa8 thi8 big critter. I yelled 'Look 
11 tit', :rnd put 1n:-: right arm up, hit the brakes, and bang, 
we hit it. i\ly lights were on dim. Sometime before I 
notieecl lights way off in the distance and he flicked at 
JJH' and r did the same to him and left them on dim. I 
rlid not reduee my speed. I was traveling about 50 
111 iles per hour." (Tr. 75). On cross-examination he 
admitted that in a ·written statement signed by him he 
;;lated he was traveling between 50 and 55 miles per 
hour (rl'r. 81); that he did not reduce his speed when he 
dimmed his lights to low beam (Tr. 83). He further 
stated tliat this was a barren country but he did not 
remember SPPing any signs "Watch for Cattle" (Tr. 85). 
DEFENSE 
Appellant Smith was asked the following quest-
ion: "~peaking specifically about the rack, who con-
'trnded it, who manufactmed it?" Objected to by 
Hespondent as heing immaterial, and the objection was 
sustained hy the Court. The Court then indicated that 
it was his view that Appellant could not go into any 
matter~ tending to prove justification or excuse (Tr. 
108). Ap1wllant's counsel, in the absence of the jury, 
madP a proffer of proof, which is set out in the trans-
eript at pages 109 to 111, inclusive. Upon objection to 
the offer hy Respondent the Court stated (Tr. 111), 
"Well, the Court feels that the offer of proof, if the 
~vidPnep were such, it would not amount to a justifi-
l'ation for violation of the statute we have here." Upon 
inqnir)' hy Appellant's counsel as to what issues would 
he trit•d the ( 'ourt stated, "Well, I think your other 
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issue is the negligence of plaintiff driver being the sol .. 
proximate e;ause of the collision." Appellant then u!-
fered in evidence the pleadings set forth in Respondent", 
second cause of action wherein Respondent allPgeu that 
defendant Cox 'vas guilty of primary negligence whid! 
caused the injury, as bearing on the issues of prnximat« 
cause. Upon this offer, which was objeded to by He-
spondent, the Court stated, "In that respect the Cour! 
is of the opinion that while the plaintiff may have 
originally made claim against defendant Cox, he wao 
not brought into the proceedings by service of prom' 
and I doubt whether plaintiff's bare claim alone would 
establish that defendant Cox was guilty of any negli-
gence. The offer is denied." (Tr. 112-113). Thereupon 
Appellant proceeded with his defense on tlw sole isrne 
of negligence of Richard Klafta as the sole cause of 
the accident. Apvellant then testified that the weathPr 
was dry, clear and cool. Visibility was very good. No 
dust, rain, wind or fog, and lights are a lot better on a 
dark night (Tr. 113). A picture marked "Exhibit 4" 
and received in evidence showed a sign on the right hand 
side of the highway some distance West of Grantsville 
on the desert. "Exhibit 5" showed one of three sign> 
as they existed on the date of the accident (Tr. 115) an<l 
was received in evidence. He further testified that 
there are other signs along the highway between Grant> 
ville and the scene of the accident reading "Range Cat-
tle". The country is open range known as the desert 
but contains winter feed that cattle and sheep winter 
on. There were cattle grazing in that general area 
(Tr. 117). This animal weighed about 1,200 lbs. anrl 
was a black Angus with white spots on her flank an<l 
belly. 
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Donald E~. Green was a driver for P. T. E. He testi-
fi<'d that he \ms JriYing Ea::;t on No. 40; that the night 
was dear, visibility good, and that visibility is much 
better on a dear, dark night. You tan see better if 
there is an» object on the highway in front of you. 
He wal' 200 or 300 yards back when he observed the 
!whL' of ;in oncoming car approaching and all of a ,-, 
,;ndden the)- jumped into the air 3 or 4 feet, then the 
ear ll!ade violent swerves and went to the right hand 
,ide of the road; that he did not believe he signalled for 
dimming lights because he was too far away (Tr. 121). 
The ruling of the Court restricting Appellant to 
the one issue of whether or not Richard Klafta was 
guilty of ngeligence which was the sole cause of the in-
juries, restricted Appellant in offering evidence as 
to the other affirmative defense hereinafter to be dis-
cussed. 
ARGUMENT 
POIN11 I. The Court erred in entering its order 
that urJon the retrial of this action the only issue will 
be that of damages, thus in effect holding that as a mat-
ter of law Appellant violated Section 27-1-33 and Sec-
tion 27-1-3.+, U.C.A. 1953, and that such violation con-
stituted negligence per se and was the proximate cause 
of Respondent's injury. 
POINT II. That such ruling by the Court precludes 
Appellant from offering any evidence in support of 
his defense of contributory negligence of Respondent 
and tht• issue of proximate cause. 
POINT III. That such ruling by the Court pre-
elude~ Appellant from offering any evidence in support 
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of his defense that Richard Klafta, the driver of the 
car in which Respondent was riding, was guilty of 
negligence, which negligence on his part was the· sole 
cause of the accident and resulting injury to Respond. 
ent. 
POIN1.1 IV. That on the retrial of this action Ap. 
pellant should he permitted to offer evidence in support 
of each of the foregoing defenses and the same should 
be submitted to the jury as questions of fact rather than 
questions of law for the Court. 
POINT V. That the trial court erred in sustain-
ing objections to Appellant's proffered evidence. 
POINT VI. That the trial court erred in instrurt-
ions given to the jury. 
POINT VII. That the trial court erred in refusinv 
to give to the jury instructions as requested by Appel-
lant. 
Point I. With respect to the offer of proof made 
by Appellant we desire to call attention to the case of 
Condas v. Adams, 15, Utah 2d 132, 388 P. 2d 803. Plain· 
tiff sued for rent under a farm lease. Defendant filed 
a counter-claim alleging fraud. On the morning of the 
trial a conference was held in Chambers. Judge Ellett 
asked counsel for defendant what his proof would IJe 
and after discussion of the matter the Judge then dis-
missed the counter-claim. This court made the follo1'·· 
ing observation: 
"Further, the trial court's dismissal of tlw ! 
counter-claim is akin to the granting of a surrunarr 1 
judgment and therefore the proposed proof and 
1 
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1 
every inferencf' arising therefrom must he viewed 
ill ihe lig;hl rnost favorable to the defendants. It 
is with these legal principles in mind that the 
defendaHts' offer of proof must be reviewed." 
'J'Jip order of the Court in our case granting a new trial 
JJ,· restricting it to damages only is also akin to the 
granting of a summary judgment against Appellant, 
and the above observations by the Court should also 
apply in eonsi<lering Appellant's offer of proof. 
~'his ease has already been tried twice. The first 
trial. before the Honorable Aldon Anderson, resulted 
iu n no cause verdict. Judge Anderson, however, felt 
he had erred in defining proximate cause in his in-
,<tructions and so he granted a new trial on all issues, 
although Re::-pondent moved for a new trial restricting 
it to damages only. 
The seeond trial was before the Honorable R. L. 
Tuckett. He submitted special interrogatories and the 
.iury hecame eonfnsed in answering the interrogatories, 
whicl1 rpsulted in their bringing in of an inconsistent 
rerdict. His first interrogatory is as follows: 
"Di<l the defendant violate the statute here 
m question by failing to properly secure the 
livestock to prevent their escape? Answer yes 
or no." 
Hi~ ~eeond interrogatory is as follows: 
"Was the defendant's violation of the statute 
a proximate cause of' the plaintiff's injury and 
darnage '! Answer yes or no." 
11 
Interrogatory No. ~ should have heen asked in the fol 
lowing form: 
"If your ans\rnr to Interrogatory No. J if 
yes, then you will answer plaintiff's Interrogatory 
No. 2." 
In the absence of this clarifying statement the jury could 
not help being confused by reason of the Court's stating 
as a positive fact that the defendant's violation of tlw 1 
statute was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injur~- and 
damage. After the jury had been out for some con-
siderable time they asked for further instructions, and 
thereupon the Court entered into a discussion with the 
jury. See Tr. commencing on page 165 and continuin~ 
to page 170. We think the actions of the Court constl-
tuted reversible error. See Cornia v. Albertson'i, 
________________ Utah ________________ , 397 P. 2d 66. 
Appellant does not object to the granting of a m·w 
trial for the reasons hereinbefore set out, but strenuously , 
objects to that part of the order which limits the third 1 
trial to damages only. It is from this part of the ruling ' 
that Appellant appeals. The effect of the Court's order 
is that Judge Tuckett has held that as a matter of law 
Appellant violated the provisions of Section 27-1-33; 
U.C.A. 1953; that such violation was the proximate 
cause of the accident and resulting injuries suffered b)· 1 
Respondent; that Respondent was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence; and that Richard Klafta, the 1 
driver of the car in which Respondent was riding, was 
either not guilty of negligence or that his negligence was 
not the sole cause of the accident. We contend that all 
of these issues presented questions of fact for the jury'> 
12 
dctu1;1ii~t'cion nnde r pro1ier instructions. We further 
('on(en<l that if ..:\ pvellant is permitted to offer evidence 
a~ to justific:ation or exeuse, as set forth in the offer 
11f proof liereinafter discussed, and the jui·y finds that 
under al I tlie circumstances surrounding the accident 
"~iwllant was justified or excused from said violation, 
then it must follow that Appellant did not violate Sec-
lion27-1-:33 and if he did not violate this section then 
he did not violate Section 27-1-34, which applies only to 
and when he violates Section 27-1-33. This section is 
,ornewliat :unliig-uout-\. Subdivision (a) provides as fol-
lows: 
"No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any 
highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or 
loaded as to prevent its contents from dropping, 
shifting, leaking or otherwise escaping there-
from." 
Then ( b) provides : 
"No person shall operate on any highway any 
vehicle ·with any load unless said load and any 
covering thereon is suitably fastened, secured and 
ronfied ac-cording to the nature of such load so as 
to prevent said covering or load from becoming 
loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to 
other users of the highway." (Emphasis added.) 
It is a matter of common knowledge that no cover-
ing~ are plaeed over trucks holding livestock. There-
fore, we must ai:;sume that subdivision (b) relates to 
truch hauling merchandise and similar articles which 
are covered while in transit. Otherwise, subdivisions 
la) and (b) nre s.rnonymous. We think, therefore, that 
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the only statute involved in this case is subdivision 
(a), but irrespective of this, and whether it app!ic8 t1, 
(a) or (b), we contend that Appellant should be per-
mitted to off er the evidenee set forth in his offer of proof 
that his truck was so constructed and loaded as to pre 
vent the cattle from escaping therefrom but due to ai1 
unfortunate accident for which Appellant was not re 
sponsible or which could not be prevented by the mr 
cise of reasonable and ordinary care and caution, thP 
three cattle escaped from said truck. Conceding for 
the purpose of this argument only that Appellant did 
violate the above statute, then we next consider the 
important question as to whether such violation con-
stitutes negligence per se, rendering him liable as a 
matter of law, or whether a violation of a statute 8Uch a> 
the one in question raised a presumption of negligcnc1, 
which may be overcome by other eYidence showing that 
under all the circumstances surrounding the event the 
conduct of Appellant was excusable or justifiablr and 
such as might reasonably have been expected fr0w a 1 
person of ordinary prudence, and that this presents 11 
question of fact to be submitted to the jury under proper 
instructions. We desire to call the Court's attention 
to the case of White v. Piney 90 Utah 484, 19~ 
P. 2d 249. Defendant was a wholesaler of beer. Neslen ' 
was his driver of a truck making deliveries. Plaintiff'i 
truck was parked to the curb headed south on Highland 
Drive. Plaintiff was standing behind his truck takw~ 
out flowers for delivery to a florist. Defendant's ~takP 
body truck was loaded with beer, barrels and ca'e~. 
On the rack was a hand trnck or dolly used in unloading 
and moving harrels of beer. As the truck passed plain 
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tiff':; trw·k u11t· wlt(·el of thP dolly ea11w off, croc.;sed the 
0tre1:t and st rud; plaintiff. Verdict for defendant. Three 
rr~ie"t10ns 'n'n' presented: (1) Was plaintiff entitled to 
in:;tnwtio11 Uial <ld'endant was negligent as a matter 
r,f J;nd (2) Did the Court err in submitting to the 
inn the quPstion of contributory negligence of plain-
tiff! (3) ·wm~ instruetion 1;~ so erroneous as to re-
quire ren'Loal of tlw judgment? The Court first dis-
cu;;~es the question of re::; ipsa loqnitur. The Court 
then procPcds to discm;s instructions No. 12 and 13, 
and as to 12 thP Court says: 
"Instruction No. 12 is clear that liability 
for defoets in a motor vehicle exists only (a) 
when a defect was known, or (b) when it could 
liave been discovered upon reasonable inspec-
tinn. ft further made clear that if there was a 
defeet in defendant's equipment they could not 
Pscape liability unless the jury found not only that 
the defect was unknown but that it could not 
have hPen discovered by reasonable, prudent in-
spection." 
llPfendant offerPd evidence (a) that the dolly was 
faotened to the truek in a proper and secure way, (b) 
that the whc'r>]s on the dolly were held in place by cotter 
pinH, ( c) that tliP~' had no knowledge of any defect in 
the dolly or the way the wheel was fastened on, ( d) that 
the hand truek or dolly had been regularly lubricated 
Hnd iniipectcd OJH'P 01· twice each week, ( e) that it had 
bl-'en tn-sPd that day shortlv before the accident was . . ' 
in good eondition, and had nothing wrong with it, (f) 
that whrn thP dollr was put back on the truck when last 
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used :;hortly before the a<'ei<lent it worked all right :inri 
:;eemed in good condition, and (g) that there was nothi11~ 
to be seen about it to indicate it was not in good con-
dition. 1'-,or :;ome reason the :;tatute involved in tf 11 , 
C'ase wa:; not raised eitlwr hy the Court or <·oun~el, ,, 1111 
so the case ,nu; tried on the theory of cornmoH law negli 
gence, but we think that the evi<lencP offered in that case 
is so similar to our offor of proof that if thP theon r.t 
justification or exeuse is permitted then the nfft>r 11f ' 
proof would be :;ufficient to iwrmit a .imy to fin<l tliat 
Appellant was justified or excused from the violation 
of the statute, so that the real question involve<l ii 
whether or not this Court will recognize the doetrinr 
adopted in California and many other states that an 
alleged violator may off er evidence of jnstifiration 111 
excuse and that the ultimate question is one of fact for 
a Jury. 
Appellant admits that there is a division of authont: 
on this question, hut we contend that this Court ha' 
elected to follow the California rule that violation of a 
statute such as the one in question raises only a pre-
:;umption of negligence. Berkovitz v. American Ri1n 
Gravel Co. (Cal.), 215 Pae. 675, is perhaps the fir,! 
California case to lay down clearly the rule. At pagr· 
677 the Court says: 
"The only question remammg open on thi> 
point is 'vhether conclusive proof of the violation 
of such a statute or ordinance is also concfo8in 
proof of negligence. Some courts have held that 
it is and :;01ne that it is not. But the true rule 
is perfectly plain. 'l'he violation of such a Jaw 
left without explanation or excuse, is conclusirc 
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of negligence, but it may be excused. If some 
good exeu:,;e appear:,; which would be a sufficient 
defense to an action for the penalty imposed by 
the law ... then the law is not really violated ... 
We find but few cases in which this is clearly 
stated, but they deserve to take preced€nce of 
all the others, as they reconcile the principle 
upon which the other cases were actually de-
rided." (Citing Sherman & Redfield on Negli-
gence, Section 467). 
This wse is cited and ref erred to in most of the 
l':t~e~ involving the violation of a :statute or ordinance 
sub~equent to the Berkovitz case. For an instruction 
approved hy California courts, together with a long 
li,;t of cases l:lupporting the rule, see B.A.J.I., Third 
RevisPd J<~dition, No. 149, commencing at page 187. Also 
B.A .• J.I., Fourth Edition, No. 149, commencing at page 
'.l8i. Also B.A.J.I. Supplement No. 149-149b, commenc-
ing at page 144. 
l:tah cases. 
We adrnit that this Court has held that violation 
of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence as a 
matter of law. 
Smith 1:. Mine & Smelter Supply co., 32 Utah 21, 
88 Pac. 683. 
Skirt c. Wheeler Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 476, 69 
P. 2d 502. 
However, these cases involve a wilful violation of an 
ordinaner govrrning the storage of dynamite and the 
wilful violation of a :statute governing the keeping of 
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explosives. These two cases will he further discu~se<l 
when we refer to the case of Thompson v. Ford Motor 
Co. This Court, however, soon began to recognize tlrnt 
the sweeping statement contained in the explosiw rasei 
above referred to had limitations. 'l'he first casp 1ra, 
White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 Pac. 441, where the 
trial court included the statement contained in the ex 
plosive cases in one of its instructions to the jury. Jn 
this case the defendant's team ran into the plaintiff 1 
while defendant was driving to the left of center of 
the street. This court reversed, holding that where , 
there was an excavation on the right side of the street 
defendant was justified in driving on the left in vio- i 
lation of the ordinances of Ogden City, in spite of the 
sweeping language in the Mine & Smelter case. 
Morrison v. Perry (on rehearing), 104Utah151, 
140 P. 2d 772. 
This court held "that the presumption of negli-
gence on the part of defendant, arising from automo 
bile collision on defendant's wrong side of the street, 
ceases the moment an explanation is offered that the 
evidence upon which the presumption was based re-
mains in the case and is to be considered by the jury 
unless there is no conflict between such evidence and 
the explanatory evidence." 
North v. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P. 2n 
871. 
This case involved the question of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence in violating two traffic statute,, 
from which we quote as follows : 
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"Pl:tintiff's driving on the wrong side of the 
street contrary to statute is prima facie evi-
dence of negligence, and calls for an explanation 
to justify his position upon the highway." (Em-
phasis added) 
Robinson v. Robinson, ____________ Utah ____________ , 394, P. 
2d 876. 
While this case does not involve the violation of 
a otatnte, it does involve the rule of absolute liability 
and to that extent it is similar to our case in which the 
trial court applied the rule of absolute liability for 
l'iolating a statute. We quote from Mr. Justice Mc-
Donough, the author of this opinion, as follows: 
"It is to be observed that even where the 
circumstances justify its application, this so-
called rule of absolute liability has the weaknesi:> 
of most generalities. There are almost always 
exceptions which prove them fallacious." 
Further quoting: 
"It will thus be seen that the so-called rule 
of 'absolute liability' is not absolute at all. Both 
the propriety of its application in the first in-
stance, and any defenses against it, are con-
ditioned by the limitations imposed by the fun-
damental standard which pervades all tort law: 
the conduct of the reasonable prudent man under 
the circumstances; and its procedural corollary, 
that whenever there is a dispute in the evidence 
or uncertainty therein as to whether that stand-
ard iR met, the question is one for the jury to 
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determine." (Citing cases in the footnote.) (Em. 
phasis added.) 
We now come to the case of Thomvson v. Fri/ti 1 
Motor Co., ____________ Utah 2d __________ , 395 P. 2d 62, decidP1] ' 
September 1, 1964, whieh we believe is conclusive of the ! 
question involved on this appeal. Plaintiff sued for in-
juries suffered when the parking brake on a Salt Lake 
City garbage truck suddenly gave way so he was un-
able to get back into and control it. Plaintiff alleged 
that the brake mechanism was defective. On the hasi, 
of depositions of the plaintiff and his co-worker the 1 
trial court ruled that plaintiff was contributorily neg 
ligent as a matter of law, and granted defendant'o mo-
tion for summary judgment. The truck in question ira' 
manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff took the truck to 
the hilly avenue section of Northeast Salt Lake Cit1 
to collect garbage. Plaintiff stopped the truck on a 
steep grade headed downhill. On stopping, plaintiff 
set the parking brake, got out and went to the rear to 
collect garbage. He left the cab door open, left the 
key in the ignition and the motor running. At about 
the time the plaintiff turned to set down the cans some 
thing snapped underneath the truck. The brake gare 
way and the truck started to roll. Plaintiff ran forward 
and grabbed the door but was unable to get into the 
truck and was thrown to the ground, sustaining injurie' 
The pivotal controversy devolves upon Section 41-6-lOJ, 
U.C.A. 1953. We quote from the opinion hy Mr. Justiee 
Crockett: 
"The defendant contends that under the aLow 
facts above recited the leaving of the truck un 
1 
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attended and the violation of the statute constitute 
proof as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence and that it proximately contributed 
to cause his injury, which preeludes his recov-
ery and justifies the summary judgment against 
him. Plaintiff rejoins that notwithstanding the 
statute, he is entitled to have his conduct judged 
on the universally applied standard of care: 
that of the reasonable, prudent man under the 
circumstances. We are aware that it has some-
times been stated as a general rule that viola-
tion of the statutory standard of care is negli-
gence as a matter of law. This i~ indeed a sound 
rule but, like all generalities, it has its limita-
tions and is applicable only under proper circum-
stanc('s." (Emphasis added) 
Justite < 'rnckett then cites and analyzes a number 
of Ftah cases "·hich we have heretofore cited, and then 
l'Ontinues: 
"Subsequent to the North case just referred 
io, this Court has in a number of cases but 
with slight variations in the language reaffirmed 
thP YiPw, which we think is the correct one, that 
violation of a standard of safety set by statute 
or ordinance is to he regarded as prima facie 
evidence of negligence, but is subject to justi-
fieation or ex<'use if the evidence is such that 
it reasonably could be found that the conduct was 
nevertlwless within the standard of reasonable 
care undPr the circumstances." (Emphasis added) 
l'iting- in tliP footnote, among others, the case of 
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Alarid r. Va11ier, 327 P.2c1 897, with this comment: 
''A well-written opinion which review8 nu. 
merous California decisions and states: •TJi1• 
presumption of negligenee which arises on the 
violation of a statute is rebuttable and may hP 
overeome by evidence of justification or Pxe~ie." 
Citing numerous law reviews and textboob in 
support of the foregoing. 
It would seem that Utah is now definately eomm 
itted to the so-called California rule. While the statutP 
involved in the 'l'hompson case is different from the 
statute involved in our case, both relate to a standard 
of care to be observed by operators of motor vehielrs. 
We think that a violation of Section 41-6-105 referred 
to in the Thompson case will expose more people tu 
the hazards of life, limb and property that rf'sult from 
a violation of Section 27-1-33. It is also noteworthy to 
mention that all of the cases cited by us refer generalli 
to any and all statutes, especially statutes or ordinanee' 
relating to a standard of care to be observed hy operator, 
of motor vehicles. When the trial court refused to allow i 
Appellant to offer evidence of justification or excuse, 
Appellant made an offer of proof referred to in the 
Statement of Facts which, if Appellant were permitted 
to offer in evidence, would have made the questi11r1 
of justification or excuse a question of fact for the 
jury, and if the order of the trial court granting a TIP\\ 
trial on damages only is sustained Appellant will be 
foreclosed from offering any evidence in the retrial 
except as to damages. Appellant therefore feel' that 
this question can be resolved in advance of the next 1 
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trial an<l will probably avoid a fourth trial. The rule 
of absolute liability i::,; a harsh one. 8uppose that a 
trucker without fault loses a wheel on his truck, cau::,;-
ing it to overturn and and permit live::,;tock to escape, 
or that he strikes an icy spot on the road or a sudden 
wind of sufficient velocity causes his truck to over-
turn, or sudden floods eaused by heavy rains, or any 
unforeseen defeets in the motor vehicle of which the 
driver is unaware even though he makes a reasonable 
inspection, to hold that he is guilty of a misdemeanor 
subject to fine or imprisonment and civilly liable in 
damages, with no opportunity to offer any evidence 
of justification or excuse, is so harsh that it is no 
wonder the courts have adopted the humanitarian doc-
trine which permits the alleged violator to offer ex-
planatory evidence of justification or excuse. In Harper 
:mrl .fames, Volume 2, Section 176, page 1010, the 
author smmuarizes the situation as follows: 
•·If negligence per se is tempered by the 
doctrine of justifiable violation, it means that 
violation of a statutory standard is negligence per 
,;e in a civil case only in the absence of evidence 
tending to establish some excuse which the court 
will recognize. If there is such evidence the 
reasonableness of the actor's conduct is for the 
jury in the light of all the circumstances, in-
cluding the statute and the justifiable reliance 
that others may usually place on tis observance. 
Now the evidence of negligence rule can be so 
administered that every case is sent to the jury, 
hut it i,; more often ruled that breach of the 
,;tatute i l' Jlrirna faeie evidence of negligence 
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so that a verdict of negligence will be direeterl 
on such a sho-wing in the absence of sornP eri-
dence tending to show factors of explanatio11 
excuse or justification ... 1'here seems to 111' a 
perceptible trend in the decisions in a nurnhei 
of states towards just such an expansion of the 
negligence per se rule." 
A number of cases support the above statement. 
Baldridge v. Cmmnings, 87 P. 2d 3G~J 
Elaine v. Lloyd, 204 P. 2d 280 
Wood v. Chicago & :ilil wa ukee Railroad Corn pan)·, 
277 P. 2d 345 
Tossman v. Newman, 233 P 2d 1 
Taylor v. Jackson, 266 P 2d 605 
Mays v. Ritchie, 5 S. W. 2d 728 
Mulberry v. Turner, 174 N.E. 471 
Highland v. Cobb, 169 N.E. 401 
Lancaster v. B & H Coach Line, lGO ~.K 'ilG 
In the light of the foregoing decisions we contenr1 
that the Court was in error in not permitting Appellan! 
to off er the evidence set forth in his off er of proof, an<l 
in the Court's ruling that violation of this statute con-
stitutes negligence per se. 
Point II. Contributory Negligence of Respondent 
and Proximate Cause. After Respondent had rested 
her case, Appellant sought to offer evidence supporting 
his defense of justification or excuse, already discu"e.d 
under Point 1, and to off er evidence of Respondent·' 
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contributory negligence and proximate caus0. The 
Court ruled that the only issue (outside of damages) 
upon which he would receive evidence was the alleged 
negligence of Richard Klafta and whether such negli-
gence was the sole cause of the accident. This ruling 
precludes Appellant from offering evidence of contribu-
torr negligenef~ of Re::-;pondent and whether such negli-
g-ence, if proved, was a contributory cause of her injuries. 
Tlie trial eourt hy its order of December 3, 1964, has 
1ww withdrawn this issue from the jury. 
We readily admit that an occupant of a car does 
not have the same duty as the driver. However, a pas-
senl!'Pr riding in a car owes a duty to protect herself 
against foreseeahle injuries. Her conduct is judged on 
the universally applied standard of care, that of a reason-
ahle. prudent person ullder the circumstances, and in 
moot instanees presents a question of fact for the jury. 
Maybee v. Maybee, 79 Utah 585, 11 P. 2d 973. 
Esernia v. Overland .Moving Co., 79 Utah 585 
Edwards v. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215, 364 P. 2d 1015 
vVhile Appellant was restricted in offering evidence 
concerning Respondent's contributory negligence, yet 
the evidence offered by Respondent and her witnesses 
disclotwd the following: That Respondent was an ex-
perienced driver; she was riding in the front seat next 
to her :"on; that Richard was driving at a speed of 50 
miles per hour on low beam; that Richard in a written 
0tatement said he was driving between 50 and 55 miles 
per hour. It is significant that just before the accident 
Respondent said to Richard, "Thank God for bringing 
us this far in safety." ('rr. 62) The jury was not bound 
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to believe their testimony as to speed, espPciall~· wht·ii 
there is physical evidence which suggests he was drivill" 
b 
at a much faster speed. Those facts developed 111 
Respondent's own witnesses \Vere that he slanmie<l 011 
his brakes, traveled 9' 8" with locked wheels, struck tlw 
carcass and his car jumped three or four feet in tlw ai1 
and then traveled 120 feet with his left front wlieP! 
locked the entire distance. From this Pvidence a jun 
as trier of the facts could logically believe that lie \\'a.-
traveling at a much faster rate of speed than 30 mile.-
per hour. 'l'here is one other matter bearing 011 Re-
spondent's negligence. She admits that she wore 1111 
seat belt and that if she had it would have probablY 
saved her from serious injuries. With the alanning 
increase of deaths on the highway and tlw publicit; 
through television, radio, newspapers and rnagazine' 
and safety first organizations, all of which advise tlw 
use of seat belts as a helpful media to prevent serinn> 
injury to travelers in automobiles, it sePms to u,; thal 
in applying the test of a reasonable and prudent per 
son contemplating a trip from Kankakee, Illinois, tr. 
Sacramento, California, in winter without taking thf 
precaution of providing herself with a seat helt pre 
sen ts a question of fact for the jury as to whether or not 
Respondent was guilty of negligance, causing or con 
tributing to her injuries. Our search of the authoritie> 
has failed to find any case involving seat belts. How-
ever, our conclusion is based upon general tort law. 
We suggest that this Honorable Court should he the 
first to pass upon this interesting problem. 
PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
The authorities are almost unanimous m holding 
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that one guilty of negligence is not liable unless said 
negligence is tlie proximate cause of the accident and 
that in most ca8es the question of proximate cause pre-
sents a que8tion of fact for the jury. The courts and 
text writers have encountered difficulty in applying the 
rule. 65 C.J.S. Sec. 103, page 645; 65 C.J.S. Sec. 104, 
page 650. This Court has approved the following defini-
tion of proximate cause: 
"The proximate cause of an injury is that 
cause which in natural, continuous sequence, un-
broken by any effective intervening cause, pro-
duces the injury and without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the active cause; 
the one that necessarily sets in operation the fact-
ors that accomplish the injury. It may operate 
directly or by intervening agencies." 
Kawagricki v. Bennett, 112 Utah 442, 189 P. 2d 
109. 
lt is the application of this rule to the facts in each 
case which causes the confusion. We claim that the 
fact~ in thiH caHe disclose that permitting the animal to 
rscape was not a natural, continuous sequence, un-
broken by a11y effective intervening cause, but on the con-
trary there were two effective intervening causes which 
hroke the chain of causation, to wit, the negligence of 
Cox, who killed the animal, and the negligence of Richard 
Klafta in striking the carcass. Respondent in her orig-
inal suit joined both Smith and Cox in separate causes 
of action. In the second cause of action against Cox 
'he alleges that lw was negligent in the following par-
tirular~: 
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''(a) After striking and killing said o!Pr·i 
defendant negligently failed and nl·glPct1>r] t
11 
put out flares or otherwise give warning tr1 ., . "I' 
proaching rnotorish; of the presern·e of said ani-
mal on said highway. 
'' (b) Defendant failed and ne~leded to j111 _ 
mediately take steps to remove :-:aid stPe!' fr,.i1
1 
said highway. 
"'l'hat the foregoing acts of negligen<'l' on the 
part of said defendant Cox caused the injurie» 
damages and loss of which plaintiff eomplaim." 
Cox was never served with :,;umm011s and did n11t 
appear in said action. Respondent later amended hrr 
complaint against Appellant by alleging a violation 111 
Section 27-1-33 and Section 27-1-34, UCA 1953. At the 
pre-trial preceding the second trial Respondent's couns1·l 
advised the Court and counsel that they were ahancl11n-
ing the common law negligence upon which their uns-
inal cause of action was based and also the issue a' tn 1 
res ipsa loquititr, and would stand solidly on the ri11- , 
lation of the above statutes. At the conclusion of RP-
spondent's case Appellant offered in evidence the alle 
gations contained in the second cause of action, on the 
theory that this was a judicial admission on the part nl 1 
Respondent and was relevant on the issue of proximatr· , 
cause. The Court sustained the objection by Respond-
ent on the theory that Cox wa:,; not a party to the actiun 
(Tr. 112). We think the Court was clearly in error. It 1 
makes no difference whether Cox was in the ra'r "r 
not. The que:,;tion is whether a statement of fact in 8 
pleading is admissible is a judi<"ial admission. 
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:H C.J.S. Evi<lence, Section 301, pagP 1071 
~later v. Larkin, 110 F. 2d 226 
Kirk v. Head, 152 S. W. 2d 726 
Know le:; v. New Sweden, 101 Pac. 81. 
Respondent herself testified that there were no cars 
tJa\•eling in front of them (Tr. 62). This being the case, 
the Cox ('ar must have lwen traveling a considerable dis-
tance ahead of the Klafta car and Cox certainly could 
have prevented the accident had he gone back a short 
distance and flagged the oncoming Klafta car. Yet 
under Re::;pondent's judicial admission he failed to do so. 
'l'herefore, the negligence of Appellant, if any, was 
li10ke11 by tlw intervening negligent act of Cox. It was 
furt!iPr l>rokt·n by the intervening negligent act of 
Jfo·lrnnl Klafta to be discussed under Point III. We 
1·11nten<l that whether the alleged negligent act of Appel-
lant was the proximate cause of the accident presents 
a que~tion of fact which should be submitted to the jury 
1in tlw n·trial of this action. 
Point III. As heretofore noted, the trial court 
ruled that the only issue, apart from damages, upon 
ll'hich the trial <"ould proceed was the issue as to whether 
11 r not Riehard Klafta was guilty of negligence which 
wa~ t11P ~ole canse of the injury, and the Court sub-
111itted this issut· to the jm~· hut by his ruling of Decem-
h~r :3, 1%+, the Court has now taken that issue from the 
.1un on thP rPtrial. We a:;sert that this issue presented 
a que~tion of fact for the jury's determination. We 
r(']y on the following cases: 
Dalley r. Wirluesfer11 Dairy, 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 
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309, which lay8 down the following ruling: 
"It has long been the rule in this stah• tlinl 
it is negligence a8 a matter of law to drive an 
automobile upon a traveled public highway at 
such a rate of speed that said automobile t
0
nttlrl 
not be stopped within the distaneP at wl1ieh tliP 
operator of such car is able to see objects uvon 1 
the highway in front of him." 
Hansen r. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 5G P. 2d 136ti, whmin 
the Court, in applying the doctrine set forth in the Dal-
ley case, says: 
''Where a driver upon a puhlit highwa.1 
with his light equipment cannot see more than , 
50 feet ahead of him it is hi8 duty to drin ai 
such a speed as will enable him to stop within 
that distance." 
While the Dalley case has been criticize<l hy tlw lnte 
Judge Wolfe, it has never been overruled. It i~ trul' 
that this Court has narrowed its application by rea~rn1 
of peculiar conditions, none of which are present in om 
case. Richard Klafta admitted that he was driving at 
such a rate of speed that he could not stop his car within 
the distance at which he was able to see an animal l.1·ing 
on the highway. This cow was no small object It 
weighed about 1,200 pounds and stood about 4 foot 
above the surface of the highway. He does not conteno 
he was blinded by the lights of the oncoming truck, 
which was 200 or 300 yards back of the point of the ac~.i 
dent, but if he was then it was his duty to reduce lu~ 
speed so that he could see the dead animal on the hi~h­
way and stop within his vision. 
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Appellant did not request the Court to instruct 
the jury that Richard Klafta was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law, but left this question for the jury's 
determination. If a jury should find, as weli they might, 
that Richard Klafta as driving at a high rate of speed 
with his lights on low beam then they could also find 
that this negligence on his part was the sole causP 
of the accident. We think, therefore, that the trial 
court was correct in submitting this issue to the jury 
and that he erred in his later ruling to the effect that 
either Richard Klafta was not negligent or if negli-
gent, his negligence was not the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. 
Point IV. Appellant contends that on the retrial 
of this action he should be permitted to off er evidence 
in support of each and all of the foregoing defenses 
and that this Court should direct the trial court to sub-
mit each of said affirmative defenses to the jury for 
their determination as questions of fact rather than 
IJUestions of law for the Court. 
Point V. Appellant contends that the trial court 
erred in sustaining Respondent's objections to Appel-
lant's proffered evidence in support of his defense 
of justification or excuse and also his offer of Respond-
ent's pleading set forth in her second cause of action, 
for the reasons specifically set forth supra and fully dis-
cussed under Points I and II. 
Point VJ. Appellant contends the Court erred in 
instruction No. 9 wherein the Court quoted Section 27-
1-33, Suh<livision (b), for the reason it is not applicable 
to the undisputed facts in this case. Subdivision (b) 
applies only to transportation of goods under cover and 
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not to livestoek being transpol'ted in open rackb, Other. 
wise, his instruetion on the one issue suhmitte<l to t;1, 
jury appears to be proper. Appellant's complaint, ho 11. 
ever, is that this issue has now been withdrawn from 
the jury by virtue of the Court's ruling of Decernhrr l. 
1964. 
Point VII. Appellant submitted to thl' Court eight 
requested instructions which covered his theory of hif 
affirmative defenses. '11 he Court refused to give any 
of these requested instructions, on the avparent throry 
that each of these affirmative defenses, except as to 
Richard Klaf ta's negligence, presented question' of 
law for the Court. If the trial court was in error then 
this Court should so indicate on this intermediate appeal 
for the guidance of the trial court and eounsel on the 
retrial of this action. We call the Court's particular 
attention to Appellant's requested instruction No. 4. If 
this Court adopts the California doctrine as to justifi 
cation or excuse, then this requested instruetion 8l10ulrl 
have been given as it has been repeatedly approved Iii 
the Courts of California. The same is also true as t11 
requested instructions No. 3 and 5. Each and all of 
the other requested instructions relate to the other de· 
fenses of contributory negligence of Respondent an,j 
proximate cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LeROY B. YOUNG, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANll 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
517 David Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
l i J!el/a11I Attorneys for Defendant 1111r. ~ Ji 
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